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The case for an extended understanding of the migration state: regulating migration in Turkey

Abstract

Migration state can be a very useful analytical tool for analysing how states regulate international migration, and for comparing the practices of different states in this realm. However, we need an extended understanding of the notion of migration state to include the regulation functions of the developing country states for international migration and to reflect on the historical changes concerning these regulation functions which take place in parallel with the changes in the economic and geo-political position of the countries. This paper starts with a discussion of Hollifield's conceptualisation of the migration state, reflecting on its existing assumptions. Hollifield's conceptualisation is reviewed critically especially based on the criticisms in Adamson and Tsourapas (2020) as well as Tsourapas (2020). While the paper benefits from the typology of nationalising, developmental, and neoliberal migration management regimes in Adamson and Tsourapas (2020), the importance of having a temporal perspective is emphasised which is lacking in this study. Rather than looking at these three types (nationalising, developmental, neoliberal) as existing in different contexts, the paper focuses on the shift from one type to the other in the case of a single country. The

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paper demonstrates how the migration state in Turkey has gone through transformations during the period from the foundation of the Republic until today. The paper then discusses the implications of this focus on Turkey for a revised and extended understanding of the concept of the migration state.

Keywords: Turkey, developmental, neoliberal, migration state, nationalising

Introduction

In the field of migration studies, there has been a focus on immigration after World War II from the periphery to the core countries in the West. This general trend was based on an understanding that considered migration from the Third to the First World or from the Global South to the Global North as the main route of international migration. However, South-to-South migration is, in fact, just as common. The way it has been conceptualised so far, the concept of migration state has also mainly focused on Western states and the economic immigration to the Western developed countries or South-to-North migration. Non-Western countries have gone through different paths of state formation which are different from the trajectories in the Western countries. Potentially, migration state can be a very useful analytical tool for analysing how states regulate international migration, and for comparing the practices of different states in this realm. However, we need an extended understanding of the notion of migration state to include the regulation functions of the developing countries for international migration and to reflect on the historical changes concerning these regulation functions which take place in parallel with the changes in the economic and geo-political position of the countries.

This paper will start with a discussion of the literature on the migration state, reflecting on the existing assumptions and limitations of this literature. The paper will then turn to the case of Turkey to discuss how the migration state has functioned in the case of Turkey during different historical periods regulating both emigration from and immigration to the country. Starting from the early period of modern Turkey, moving on to the 1950s and 1960s when bilateral labour agreements were signed with the industrial states of Europe; to the period after the Oil Crisis and the halt of labour immigration to Europe during the 1970s; the emergence of new migration patterns during the 1980s and 1990s due to several changes (such as the military coup in the country and a new constitution, wars in the Middle East, and neoliberalisation) and the changes in migration governance with the AKP governments since the 2000s, the paper will demonstrate how the migration state in Turkey has gone through transformations during this period. The paper will then discuss the implications of this focus on Turkey for a revised and extended understanding of the concept of migration state.

Hollifield's conceptualisation of the migration state

This paper will use Hollifield's (2004) concept of the migration state while pointing out the limitations of his use of it and proposing an extended understanding of this notion which will make its application for contexts that are outside of the Global North possible. Hollifield argues that modern states face a dilemma while they are dealing with the impacts of globalisation and the increasing levels of international migration. He argues that states are trapped in a *liberal paradox* (Hollifield, 1992). On the one hand, international economic forces like trade, investment, and migration are pushing states towards more openness, especially since the end of WWII. On the other hand, the international state system and domestic political forces exert pressure on states for more closure. This paradox reveals some of the contradictions of liberalism (Hollifield, 2004; Hollifield et al., 2008; Hollifield et al., 2017). This is a liberal paradox because "the economic logic of liberalism is one of openness, but the political and legal logic is one of closure" (Hollifield, 2004, p. 887). Hollifield (2004, p. 896) presents the case of "guest workers" as the perfect example of the liberal paradox. He argues that importing labour during the 1950s and 1960s was a logical move for states and employers; it was in line with the growing trend towards internationalisation. However, when it became clear that the "guests" were going to stay and become permanently settled, those liberal states increased their efforts to stop further migration, going in the direction of more closure. According to him, transnationalism which can take the forms of trade, cross-border investment, and international migration can bring challenges to the sovereignty of the nation state. In terms of international migration, he argues that especially unauthorised movement of people across national boundaries can challenge the principle of sovereignty and there is a need for at least some degree of territorial closure.

Hollifield (2004) also discusses the transformation of the state in terms of its functions. He states that the Westphalian state is primarily a *garrison state*, which tries to maximise its power, protect its territory and people, and pursue national interests. Nevertheless, the state has also undertaken economic functions at least starting from the industrial revolution in Europe and has also pursued free trade policies. These have given rise to the formation of the *trading state*. Hollifield argues that the emergence of the trading state also brings the rise of the *migration state*, for which migration as well as commerce and finance drive considerations of power and interest (2014, p. 888). The global integration of markets for goods, services, and capital gives rise to higher levels of international migration. For that reason, those states that aim to support free trade and investment should also be prepared to have higher levels of migration. States usually respond to the challenge by promoting the migration of highly skilled, while limiting the mass migration of other groups:

> *Many states… are willing, if not eager, to sponsor high-end migration because the numbers are manageable and there is likely to be less political resistance to the importation of highly skilled individuals. However, mass migration of unskilled and less educated workers is likely to meet with greater political resistance, even in situations and in sectors like construction or health care, where there is high demand for this type of labor.* (Hollifield, 2004, p. 902)

For Hollifield (2004), the way in which migration is managed by the powerful liberal states is crucial, as they will be setting the trend for other countries. Although he proposes that states should cooperate to build an international migration regime, he is not very optimistic about its possibility. This is mainly because of the asymmetry of interests, especially between the developing and developed countries, which will prevent them from cooperating on international migration.

Critique of Hollifield's use of the migration state

As summarised above, in the way Hollifield has conceptualised it, the concept of migration state has mainly focused on Western states and the economic migration from developing to developed Western countries. This is an implication of the fact that the existing research on immigration policy has almost exclusively focused on Western liberal democracies (Natter, 2018). Potentially, migration state can be a very useful analytical tool for analysing how states regulate international migration, and for comparing the practices of different states in this realm. However, we need an extended understanding of the notion of migration state to include the regulation functions of developing country states for international migration and to reflect on the historical changes concerning these regulation functions which take place in parallel with the changes in the economic and geo-political position of these countries.

Adamson and Tsourapas (2020), provide an important critique of Hollifield's conceptualisation of the migration state. They argue that much of the current literature on migration and citizenship depends on studies of Europe and North America and has a bias towards liberal democratic states. The findings of these studies cannot be easily transferred to other contexts. They argue that Hollifield's concept has four biases which restrict its "conceptual portability" (2020, p. 858). These are an immigration bias, an economic migration bias, a state capacity bias, and a liberal bias. *Immigration bias* refers to the fact that Hollifield's concept of migration state focuses on state management of migration flows *into* a destination country. In other words, it looks at the management of immigration rather than emigration, being applicable to receiving states rather than sending or transit states. *Economic bias* is about how Hollifield's migration state focuses on the state management of economic migration, but not on management of political and forced migration. *State capacity bias* is related to the migration state concept's focus on advanced industrial countries which have high levels of state capacity, neglecting an analysis of states with low levels of capacity. *Liberal bias* refers to the focus of the migration state concept on states with liberal democratic regime types, with limited applicability for illiberal democracies, authoritative regimes, autocracies, etc. Tsourapas (2020) argues that non-democratic migration states of the Global South often encounter an *illiberal paradox*: while seeking to restrict emigration for political and security reasons, they also seek to support emigration for economic reasons (for attracting remittances, decreasing unemployment, and overpopulation, etc.).

Adamson and Tsuorapas (2020, p. 855) claim that what Hollifield is referring to is, in fact, the *liberal immigration state*. They propose three additional types of migration

states (*nationalising*, *developmental*, and *neoliberal*) which make it possible to have a more comprehensive understanding and theorisation of state migration management in those countries which are not in the Global North. For the *nationalising migration state*, the focus is not on markets and rights, but rather identity-based and politically driven. Accordingly, forced expulsions, population exchanges, and refugee flows should be studied as components of migration policy for nationalising migration states, as their attempts to create ethno-religious homogeneity. For the *developmental migration states*, their developmental strategies may depend on labour export through emigration. They use labour emigration to both reduce unemployment and increase foreign exchange reserves through remittances. Finally, the *neoliberal migration states* explicitly seek to monetise migration flows through the use of instruments such as citizenship-by-investment schemes and the use of refugees and migrants to get benefits from external bodies like states or international organisations. In addition to these three types of migration states, in a more recent study, Sadiq and Tsourapas (2021) also refer to the *postcolonial migration state* for post-independence migration management in countries like India and Egypt.

In this paper, I will benefit from Adamson and Tsourapas's (2020) conceptualisation of different types of migration states and demonstrate how the Turkish migration state has been transformed from a nationalising to a developmental, and later to a neoliberal migration state during the history of the Republic from 1923 until today.

Turkish migration state during different periods

There is a general impression that Turkey's participation in international migration started with labour migration to European countries during the 1960s. However, contrary to this belief, Turkey has experienced mass inflows and outflows of people starting from the last quarter of the 18th century during the period of the Ottoman Empire (Akgündüz, 1998). İçduygu and Aksel (2013, p. 167) talk about four key periods for migration patterns in Turkey: "a) the two-way immigration and emigration circulation in the early period of modern Turkey; b) the emigration boom since the 1950s; c) the emergence of new migration patterns in the 1980s; and d) the new forms of migration governance employed since the 2000s". They argue that starting from the early 20th century, the Turkish state has used mobility both within and across borders as an instrument for the goal of modernisation, and state policies for both emigration and immigration have been key components of the nation-building process. One example of this is encouraging the immigration of people who are of Turkish origin or have Islamic faith to Turkey and discouraging non-Muslims from staying in Turkey (İçduygu & Aksel 2013, p. 168). However, during the different periods mentioned above, there have been changes in terms of the main aim and focus of government policies regarding immigration and emigration. For that reason, it is crucial to look at these periods separately to clarify the dominant aspects of the Turkish migration state during each period.

1. Early period of Modern Turkey (1923–1950s): the nationalising migration state

As Adamson and Tsourapas (2020) argue, the notion of *nationalising migration state* presents a challenge to the assumption that economic and market concerns dominate as the major factors in state migration policies, demonstrating the possible political, and ideological roots of state migration policy. This was also relevant for the early period of modern Turkey. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire triggered mass population movements, especially in the form of forced population exchanges (Kolluoğlu, 2013). Already in 1913 and 1914, the Ottoman Empire had had population exchanges with Bulgaria and Greece. There have been continuities in not only social, economic, and political structures but also in government policies between the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. The Turkification agenda was one of the major continuities between the two periods and "the founders of the Turkish nation state inherited a legacy from the previous period that would shape both their mentality as well as practices in nationalising Turkey" (Şeker, 2013, p. 8). Turkification took place together with Islamification, and both served the homogenisation of the population through the emigration of non-Muslim populations from Anatolia and the immigration of Turkish Muslim populations especially from the Balkan countries (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). The transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic has been a period of nation-building through the state management of forced migration (Yildirim, 2007).

The founders of the Turkish Republic had a modernist project which intended to homogenise the society within the area specified in the National Pact. "A society that traditionally had been known as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural one would be transformed into a uniform and homogeneous Turkish nation-state" (Kirişçi, 2000) After the Turkish War of Independence, at the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, Turkey and Greece agreed on the exchange of populations[2] excluding Greeks in Istanbul and Turks in western Thrace. During those years, the migration of Muslims from the Balkan countries continued. As Akgündüz (1998, p. 112) argues, "(t)he factors generating Muslim emigration were mainly political instability in the countries of origin; mistrust and implicit and explicit discriminatory policies of the governments; close religious, cultural and in most cases linguistic affinities with Turkey; sometimes kinship and familial ties between immigration pioneers and those left behind; and Turkey's

[2] Regarding population exchanges, this note by Shields (2016) is crucial: "By the end of World War I, both the Great Powers, which demanded protection and expulsion, and the Turkish nationalists, who responded to those demands, had adopted two notions that would hardly have been recognizable only a century earlier, before far-flung empires housing multilingual and multireligious populations had given way to would-be homogenous nation-states: Muslims and non-Muslims were unable to coexist, and a diverse society was a pre-modern anomaly. This article argues that the unprecedented and internationally-administered forced migration known by the euphemism 'population exchange' has its roots in the centuries-long legacy of European fantasies about the brutality of 'the Turk', while at the same time satisfying the much more contemporary desire of an emerging Turkish-nationalist elite, which seized on the 'exchange' as a way to consolidate its new state and legislate a foundational Turkish identity" (p. 121).

generous admission policy". The Law on Settlement (Tur. *İskan Kanunu*) which came into effect in 1934 indicates that only those of Turkish descent and culture can migrate to and settle in Turkey. However, this nationalist concept of the law did not bring changes to the admission policy in practice and Muslims have been regarded as eligible for migration and settlement (Akgündüz, 1998). The major concern in terms of migration during this period was the management of immigrants who came to the country, rather than emigrants. The state used the concept of a migrant to refer to those of Turkish origin who moved to Turkey, not those non-Muslim populations who left the country (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013, p. 171). Consequently, as Adamson and Tsourapas (2020, p. 865) argue, the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic brought the creation of a migration management regime which is based on the homogenisation of the population. This is what the *nationalising migration state* entailed during this period. Migration in Turkey was mostly characterised by the exchange of populations and the process of nation-building until the 1950s.

2. The period between 1950s and 1980: the developmental migration state

Adamson and Tsourapas (2020, p. 868) argue that the developmental migration state has the aim of using emigration policy for exporting labour and decreasing domestic socio-economic pressures. The Turkish state during the period between 1950 and 1980 demonstrates these characteristics. While looking at the international labour migration from Turkey during the 1960s, Penninx (1982, p. 785) emphasises that while the "free choice" of individual migrants is largely shaped by the regulations of industrial nations, the "sending country" may also have a significant impact on the size and nature of that migration. Sayari (1986) also states that along with the policy preferences of the industrial European countries, Turkey's migration policies also played a significant role in the growth of the migratory flow between Turkey and Western Europe during the 1960s and early 1970s. Especially after the Second World War, migration in the context of Turkey changed and emigration from Turkey became a part of the migration strategy. In the case of Turkey, especially during the 1960s, we see a "state-sponsored labour emigration" through agreements between the governments of Turkey and industrialised countries that had labour shortages As Abadan-Unat (1995) argues, the steep rise in Turkish emigration especially to Europe during 1960s coincided with Turkey's first five-year development plan (1962–1967). Those who prepared the plan argued that "the export of excess, unskilled labour to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment" (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 14). Emigration was considered a way of reducing demographic and labour market pressure (Paine, 1974; İçduygu, 1991). These planners also believed that those who emigrate might acquire new skills and contribute to the industrialisation of Turkey. The new skills and training of migrant workers would be used upon their return and they would also bring foreign capital which would be invested in the development of their local communities (Sayari, 1986, p. 92–93). The state policy, in general, was based on encouraging the flow of remittances and facilitating the easy

return of migrants (İçduygu & Aksel 2013, p. 173). Turkish migrants have indeed sent a significant amount of remittances and the Turkish government also came up with some policies to encourage migrants to send remittances (Martin, 1991), even though it was argued that the level of remittances to Turkey was not determined by special programs which intended to attract remittances (Straubhaar, 1986). Migrants' perceptions of the stability of the Turkish economy had more impact on their remittance sending.

During the 1950s and 1960s, Turkish migration was characterised by bilateral labour agreements and consequently, during 1960s, there was a huge increase in emigration. "While in 1960 only 2,700 workers had left Turkey, the number rose to 27,500 in 1963 and reached 615,827 in 1973" (Abadan-Unat, 1995, p. 279) The most important of those agreements was signed between Turkey and Germany. Signing bilateral labour agreements was a viable solution for both countries at the time. While Germany expected to have a temporary labour supply and sustain its economic growth without being pressured to raise wages, Turkey hoped that labour migration would support economic development and modernisation through remittances and future return migration (Sari, 2003). Although initially, it was meant to be a cooperative agreement that would benefit both countries, Germany's need for foreign labour declined during the 1970s and the two countries moved away from a cooperative model of labour migration (Sirkeci et al., 2012). The large flow of labour migrants to Western Europe during the period 1968–1973 suddenly stopped in 1973 especially due to the Oil Crisis which triggered economic stagnation, and this marked the end of large-scale state-led labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe. However, the end of the flow of labour migrants did not result in the end of migration as a whole. The migration by family reunification of Turks in Western Europe continued and by the year 1980, the total Turkish population in Europe increased to an estimate of two million (Penninx, 1982, p. 789).

3. The period between 1980s and 2000: the early neoliberal migration state

During the 1980s, there have been significant changes in the Turkish migration regime. First, the mass immigration of "non-Turks" to Turkey for the first time in the history of the modern Turkey necessitated the taking of new measures for migration management. Additionally, the implementation of neoliberal policies attracted foreign direct investments and decreased the importance of remittances for the Turkish economy (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013, p. 175). The focus of migration policies shifted from encouraging the return of labour migrants to accepting the fact that most emigrants would stay in European countries and increasing the engagement with emigrants in the countries where they are living. Especially during the early 1990s, the state took several measures and formulated incentives to increase the engagement of emigrants with Turkey (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013, p. 177). As Kilic and Biffl (2022) argue, with the fourth National Development Program (1979–1983) came the beginning of a new phase of migration policy in Turkey. In this phase, Turkey decided to implement diaspora policies in relation

to Europe where the Turkish diaspora was used as a political leverage for endorsing Turkey's accession to the European Common Market (Düvell, 2014). Although the focus was mostly on diaspora policies, the emigration of skilled migrants (brain drain) also became a major policy concern and the return migration of highly skilled Turkish-origin migrants was promoted (Kilic & Biffl, 2022).

4. Migration after 2000: Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments and the late neoliberal migration state

Adamson and Tsourapas (2020) argue that in a different way from the developmental migration state, the neoliberal migration state explicitly monetises migration flows. The authors also give two examples to demonstrate how neoliberal migration states operate: citizenship-by-investment schemes and using refugees and migrants to extract revenues from states or international organisations. "In these two examples of neoliberal forms of migration management, states strategically use population mobility as a means of generating revenue" (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2020, p. 868). About the first case, the literature on citizenship-by-investment schemes mostly considers purchasing citizenship through these programs as an indication of the commodification of citizenship by those states which embrace the logic of the market (Shachar & Hirschl, 2014; Tanasoca, 2016; Parker, 2017). There are also those scholars who argue that these processes go beyond commodification and "are part of a neoliberal political economy of belonging" (Mavelli, 2018). Such "market-mediated remaking of citizenship" (Sparke, 2006) leads to the market value becoming the main criterion for membership and states aim to attract "elite migrant subjects" (Ong, 2006, p. 501).

Turkey is currently among those countries which offer citizenship by investment programmes, together with countries like Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Malta, Cyprus, Montenegro, Jordan, and Moldova (Surak, 2021a). In the case of Turkey, the Citizenship by Investment (CBI) scheme was established in 2017 and it was amended in 2018. As the Ministry of Interior has announced, 1,000 foreign citizens mostly from Middle Eastern countries obtained Turkish citizenship through the investment programme and that 1,700 other applications were pending (Utku & Sirkeci, 2020). According to the CBI scheme introduced in January 2017, although there were multiple options, purchasing property became an attractive way to get citizenship which required a minimum of $1 million investment before. New regulations came in September 2018, which made it possible to give citizenship to foreigners in exchange for: "(1) Purchasing real estate worth at least $ 250,000 (down from $1 million); (2) or putting $500,000 into a fixed capital investment; (3) or keeping a minimum of $500,000 in a Turkish bank account for at least three years (down from the earlier minimum of $3 million); (4) or generating 50 jobs (down from 100 jobs)" (Gunduz et al., 2022, p.701)[3]. It has been reported that wealthy people from Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan who wanted to move their base because of political

[3] Three months later, in December 2018, there was another amendment which made it possible for foreigners to apply for Turkish citizenship by buying real estate from unfinished or off-plan projects (Gunduz et al., 2022).

pressure or turmoil in their countries showed the greatest interest to the Turkish CBI scheme (Surak, 2021b).

Regarding the second case, namely using refugees and migrants to extract revenues, we especially see cases of monetisation of forced migration. The governments in the Global North are increasingly unwilling to receive refugees and this resulted in the development of strategies that aim to keep displaced populations in the Global South. One such strategy is providing financial support to the states of first asylum: "Formalized via migration 'deals' and refugee 'compacts', the commodification of forced displacement encourages refugee rent-seeking behavior across Global South states, which seek to attract external economic support in order to continue hosting refugee populations within their borders" (Adamson & Tsourapas, 2020, p. 869). This has especially become manifest during the Syrian refugee crisis.

The Turkish state was one of the original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention. However, the country had signed the Convention with a geographical reservation, limiting the country's obligations to asylum seekers only from its Western neighbours and allowing only temporary asylum to non-European asylum seekers until they were sent to third countries (Kirişçi, 2000). Although there were these long-term strategies to avoid asylum from the rest of the Middle East, Turkey found itself hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees after the Syrian Civil War started (Aydemir, 2022). Refugee agreements were signed between the EU and Turkey, and Turkey promised to contain refugees and keep them outside of Europe in exchange for financial support (Haferlach & Kurban, 2017)[4]. There are scholars who challenge the interpretation of the EU-Turkey deal as "another example of the power of the EU to simply externalize its border control policies" (Heck & Hess, 2017, p. 37) and criticise the assumption of a one-way, top-down process started by the EU. According to these scholars, the Turkish government pragmatically benefits from the fear of mass migration to Europe (Heck & Hess, 2017, p. 47) and that the EU leaders became dependent on Turkey because of this deal. Heck and Hess argue that the Turkish government has realised how to use the migration card and "Turkey has gained some sort of a *carte blanche* vis-à-vis the EU" (2017, p. 52).

While the EU-Turkey deal has made it possible for the Turkish government to use the "migration card" for its political aims in the international arena, it is obviously also a result of the EU's attempts to outsource the management of migration flows to Turkey. The EU is not accepting its fair share of responsibility for refugees. The deal continues to be questioned with regard to its legality and compatibility with international law. It has also been criticised for not protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.

EU member states' reactions to the migration crisis have displayed a lack of solidarity and unwillingness to find a unified solution to the worst humanitarian crisis of our time.

[4] In addition to financial support, the Turkish government also emphasised the prospect of visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens in the Schengen area and acceleration of the EU accession negotiations justifying the agreement in the country. However, after the attempted *coup d'état* in Turkey in 2016, EU politicians and bureaucrats declared that visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens did not seem probable under the circumstances.

The deal reached with Turkey to manage the influx of migrants and refugees has created a dangerous precedent for EU cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum, due to its controversial legal nature and the lack of proper procedural safeguards (Batalla Adam 2017, p. 56).

Conclusion

Migration state is a useful conceptual tool for analysing how states manage international migration. The concept, as developed by Hollifield, has become a key concept in migration studies for discussing migration management. However, as Adamson and Tsourapas argue, the concept as it has been defined by Hollifield has some limitations, as it mainly focuses on "economic immigration in advanced liberal democracies" (2020, p. 853). It cannot adequately look at the connection between migration and processes such as nation-building, developmentalism, or neoliberalisation. In this article, I have followed Adamson and Tsourapas's (2020) proposal to extend the concept to be able to use it for an analysis of how states in the Global South manage international migration. Focusing on the case of Turkey, the paper has aimed to demonstrate how the migration state in Turkey has gone through transformations starting from the early period of modern Turkey until today. The paper looked at the four key periods for migration patterns in Turkey, namely: 1) the early period of modern Turkey (1923–1950s); 2) the period between the 1950s and 1980s; 3) the period between the 1980s and 2000s, and 4) the period after 2000. By focusing on these four periods, the paper has discussed how the Turkish state has transformed from 1) a *nationalising migration state* during the early period of the Republic which was based on the homogenisation of the population; 2) through a *developmentalist migration state* during the period between the 1950s and 1980s where emigration and attracting migrant remittances was a part of the developmentalist strategy; and 3) an *early neoliberal migration state* between 1980s and 2000 which was characterised by decreasing importance of remittances due to increasing foreign direct investments, increasing engagements with the diaspora and efforts to facilitate the return migration of the highly skilled Turkish-origin migrants; to 4) and finally to a *late neoliberal migration state* where migration flows were explicitly monetised by the AKP governments.

For looking closely at the neoliberal migration state, I have looked closely at two examples to shed light on how the state has used population mobility as a means of generating revenue: citizenship-by-investment scheme and using refugees and migrants to extract revenues from states or international organisations. However, while discussing the second example, namely the EU-Turkey deal about the Syrian refugees, I discussed that while the Turkish government is using the "migration card" for its political aims in the international arena, the deal is also a result of the EU not accepting its fair share of responsibilities for the Syrian refugees. Therefore, while the deal between Turkey and the EU can be considered an instance of monetisation of refugee flows on the part of the Turkish government, it is also an example that makes it more visible that the migration policies of the EU are going towards stricter conditions for those individuals who want to enter or settle in the region, becoming *Fortress Europe*. As Adamson and

Tsourapas (2020) argue, the typology of migration states (nationalising, developmental, and neoliberal) helps us to reflect on the globally intertwined nature of migration regimes. These different types of migration states in the Global South in general and Turkey in particular have emerged partially in response to the developments in Europe and the rest of the world. The nationalising migration state in Turkey emerged somewhat due to the pressures to adopt the nation state model. Later, the Turkish developmental migration state rose in connection to the labour needs of the migrant-receiving countries. Finally, the emergence of the neoliberal migration state in Turkey is also tied to the broader processes of neoliberalisation and increasing inequalities all over the world. Specifically in the case of the EU-Turkey deal and how refugees and the "migration card" are being used by the Turkish government, the global rise of populist nationalism is an important explanatory factor as well as the Turkish government's attempts to monetise the migration flows.

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